Chapter 6
Global Forest Governance: Multiple Practices of Policy Performance

Bas Arts and Innocent Babili

> *Many people have come to the conclusion that the international forest policy process has reached an impasse (…) After taking stock of the abundance of international agreements, processes and initiatives that are of consequence to forest-related issues, we would argue this is not the case—there is a large amount of interest and political will in addressing forests at the international level.*
>
> McDermott et al. 2007, p. 119

> *Success and failure do not exist 'in nature', independent of the observer, but are constituted in social interaction among a wide variety of actors (…). This raises the question of why some policies and projects are regarded as a success/failure and with which consequences.*
>
> Van Assche et al. 2011, p. 1

6.1 Introduction

Boay village, Babati district, Tanzania, July 2009—Often, as a European, you forget how cold it can be in Africa. This morning we travelled from Babati town to Boay village in the Northern, mountainous part of the district, close to the border of Kenya, a trip of about one and half hours over red sandy roads that slowly but surely climb into the mountains. When we reach the village, we find cloud-surrounded houses and trees. After about ten members of the village forest committee have arrived for a group interview, we decide to decamp to the nearby forest, which is managed jointly by the committee and the district forest department, in the so-called Joint Forest Management (JFM) programme. This is even better, despite the freezing cold, because the interview is now really 'on-site'. We want to talk about how the JFM rules on forest use and management, which were introduced about 15 years ago, have impacted on the traditional forest institutions of the village, such as the protection of sacred forest patches and tree species. At the end of the group interview, one member of the village forest committee asks us about the possibility of starting a REDD project in their forests with the help of our connections. We are surprised. The idea of REDD—Reduced Emissions from

Deforestation and Forest Degradation—is to pay developing countries money for conserving their forests, because that would contribute to mitigating climate change. But at the time, it was a new policy: it had been introduced in climate change negotiations only two years previously. Yet this global idea had already been heard of in this remote area of Africa. Later, we were told that the villagers learnt about REDD from other European researchers who had visited their area.

The story above shows how strong the global-local nexus in governance is. The world has become flat, according to globalisation theorist and *New York Times* columnist Thomas Friedman (2006). So if we talk about global forest governance, we should not forget about these horizontal links and focus solely on negotiations and conflicts in United Nations (UN) offices. Global ideas, norms and rules, for example on REDD, travel from the global to the local and may make differences on the ground. In turn, practices and experiences in specific sites may feed into national and international dialogues on forests (Arts 2004). This horizontal perspective of 'glocal' networks in which ideas and norms travel to remote places is very different from the conventional and vertical way of looking at global forest governance . In such accounts, the concepts of 'international regime' and 'national politics' are key (Rittberger 1993). A regime refers to rules (from principles to procedures) that govern international issues such as security or the environment. Besides being interested in regime design at the international level, regime scholars are also interested in regime effectiveness at the national level: whether the regime objectives are realised within the countries that are party to it. Often, from a regime perspective, it is argued that global forest governance has largely failed. Firstly, deforestation and forest degradation are still going on globally, despite many international policy initiatives to reduce or stop them, and secondly, the regime lacks a legally binding international treaty that can enforce change upon countries. But if we take the first perspective of the 'glocal networks' as a starting point, then a different picture emerges that puts the idea of 'failure' into critical perspective.

In developing our argument, we will build on: (1) interpretive policy analysis and evaluation (Wagenaar 2011); (2) discursive institutionalism (Schmidt 2008); and (3) practice theory (Schatzki 2002). Interpretive approaches consider policies as 'systems of meaning' that constitute multi-interpretable realities of policy problems, solutions and evaluations. This point of departure implies that policy successes and failures are not discovered out there, but instead are actively constructed, or 'performed', by evaluators, in a way that depends on the evaluators' theoretical perspectives, evaluative methods, personal values, and the like. The second concept, discursive institutionalism, is an example of interpretative policy analysis, through which scholars try to understand how new ideas and discourses feed into institutional arrangements of rules, norms and beliefs, and, via these arrangements, impact on human behaviour. Yet discursive institutionalism has been criticised for being too focused on *formal* institutional arrangements and too silent on how, in practice, people *enact* ideas and rules, and with what consequences; hence, it is criticised for not being practice based. In this chapter we have therefore added practice theory to discursive institutionalism. This also fits in well with the above idea of 'glocal networks', because practice theory is interested in how people and their doings, sayings, and things are connected spatially and temporally. We will then merge these

three conceptual building blocks, to create the concept of 'multiple practices of policy performance'. This concept refers to two things: (1) the various effects global forest governance potentially produces on the ground; and (2) the different ways in which evaluators might interpret such effects.

In terms of terminology, we prefer 'global governance' over 'international regime' or 'international policy' (although we will sometimes use these terms to relate to the literature). The reason is that 'global' recognises the global political spaces beyond the nation state more than 'international', and 'governance' recognises the relevance of private actors and regulation in governing forests more than 'regime' or 'policy'. Global governance should, however, not be considered an autonomous layer above national or local politics, but instead as being part of 'glocal networks', as indicated above. Also, in this chapter we focus merely on local practices in the global South and not on those in UN offices or national departments. To illustrate our arguments, we will present in-depth case studies of participatory forest management and forest certification in Tanzania, and show how these practices are co-shaped by global ideas, norms and rules. Strategically, practices that seem to work, i.e. produce positive effects on forests and/or local communities on the ground, have been selected to put the 'failure account' into critical perspective.

The starting point of the chapter is nonetheless the failure of global forest governance, as argued by various scholars. Section 6.2 goes into the first argument for failure (deforestation), Sect. 6.3 into the second (no forest treaty). Both are put into critical perspective. In Sect. 6.4, we will introduce our own theoretical framework, built upon the concepts of discourse, institution and practice, to interpret global forest governance differently. The notion of 'multiple practices of policy performance' is introduced in Sect. 6.5. Then we turn to empirics in three steps. Firstly, global discourses and norms related to the two Tanzanian case studies are identified and briefly introduced (Sect. 6.6); secondly, participatory forest management in Babati district is dealt with (Sect. 6.7) and, thirdly, forest certification in Kikole community (Sect. 6.8). While the cases are being analysed, global ideas and norms and national policies and local practices become intertwined. Finally, in Sect. 6.9, the conclusions are presented and their implications considered.

6.2 The Assumed Failure of Global Forest Governance

The general perception on the performance of global forest governance is that it has largely failed. The key arguments for this failure, both in science and popular media, are twofold: (1) deforestation has continued globally, despite many international policy initiatives that have tried to stop or reduce it, and (2) the international forest regime lacks a legally binding core, an international forest treaty 'with teeth', which addresses forest issues and problems, including deforestation (Dimotrov 2005; Humphreys 2006; McDermott et al. 2007; Rayner et al. Rayner 2010). According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 2010 global forest assessment, every year we lose about 13 million hectares of forests worldwide—an area about four

times bigger than the Netherlands. Hotspots of deforestation are found in Australia, Brazil, Congo Basin and Indonesia. Deforestation has many consequences for people, biodiversity and climate: about 2 billion people depend on forests for their livelihoods one way or the other; about half of the world's biodiversity in plants and animals is found in tropical rainforests, which cover around 6 % of the earth's surface; and deforestation and forest degradation are responsible for about 15–20 per cent of the human-induced climate change problem (Stern 2007; Wilson 2006). Important drivers of deforestation are (1) forest conversion for agricultural purposes, whether small-scale for local livelihoods or large-scale for commercial agriculture, such as cattle ranching, palm oil, soya and biofuels; (2) the creation of infrastructure, such as roads, development projects and dams for hydro power; (3) the harvesting of timber, particularly the cut-and-run method that does not sustain the forest base; and (4) biophysical and climatic conditions that enable or stimulate deforestation (easy access for humans, valuable tree species, etc.) (Geist and Lambin 2001; Scouvart et al. 2007). The causes underlying these drivers are considered to be, amongst others: economic factors (poverty, economic development, globalisation, transnational companies), demographic factors (such as increasing population pressure in many forested areas), cultural factors (such as values and norms related to nature and society) and political and institutional factors (such as war and conflicts; and the absence, weakness or non-implementation of policies, laws and regulations).

Without denying the actual or potential devastating consequences of forest conversion in specific areas, both for people and nature, a number of counterarguments may put things into perspective. Firstly, the 2010 FAO global forest assessment also acknowledges that the figure of 13 million hectares of annual deforestation is a *gross* one and takes no account of compensatory reforestation, the planting of new forests, or natural regeneration. When these are factored in, the net rate is 'only' around 5 million hectares, so the world gains about 8 million hectares of forests a year. Of course, the forests gained are mainly plantations (about 5 of the 8 million hectares), which have a bad image (Sands 2005): poor in biodiversity, often planted at the cost of land uses that would be more beneficial to people and having adverse environmental effects (on the hydrology, soil, landscape quality, incidence of fire, etc.). But plantations are useful too: they provide timber and non-timber forest goods, as well as forest services such as erosion prevention on slopes, carbon sequestration and even (some) biodiversity. Secondly, the figures for forest cover change in the 2000s are more positive than those of the 1990s (FAO 2010). Annual deforestation was about 20 per cent lower in the first decade of the new millennium than in the 1990s. Of course, these aggregate figures should be handled with care. There may be dramatic differences between areas in terms of the local situation and the changes over time. Moreover, there is fierce debate about the credibility and reliability of the FAO figures, because national inventories of different kinds and of different quality are integrated and up-scaled into one global dataset, producing all kinds of problems and controversies (compare Chap. 9 of this book on the construction of European biodiversity datasets). It has even been suggested that the errors involved in the global estimates may undermine the reliability of aggregate forest trends and the evidence for overall forest decline (Grainger 2008).

A third and final counterargument to the 'deforestation narrative' (Pülzl 2010) concerns the so-called phenomenon of 'forest transition', which can at least partly explain the decline in net deforestation rate. Meyfroidt and Lambin (2011) define a forest transition as 'a national-scale shift from a shrinking to an expanding forest area'. Both in Europe and North America, countries have gone through such transitions in their history, but today a number of developing countries (e.g. China, Chile, Vietnam and India) are also experiencing a shift from deforestation to forest expansion. Meyfroidt and Lambin (2011) distinguish five pathways that are potentially behind forest transitions: (1) the economic development pathway (which leads to less pressure on the forests through, amongst others, agricultural intensification, urbanisation and substitution of forest-related products); (2) the forest scarcity pathway (which increases timber and NTFP prices, the will to invest and political pressure to take action); (3) the state forest policy pathway (which, if acted upon, implies more and better conservation and sustainable use of forests); (4) the smallholder land use intensification pathway (e.g. through agroforestry, forest gardens and re/afforestation of abandoned lands); and (5) the globalisation pathway (while this process contributes to deforestation, it can also enhance forest conservation and management by bringing new approaches, technologies and knowledge). But these pathways are contingent upon socio-economic and political developments in specific areas, and unexpected events might intervene. Hence, the form and timing of a national forest transition are hard to predict for regions and countries. On the basis of comparative research, however, Palo and Lehto (2012) claim that certain preconditions are key: private forest ownership that is respected, market institutions that work, appropriate public policies and good governance. Together these factors should increase the economic value of forests and decrease the opportunity costs for sustainable forest management.

To sum up: at an aggregate level, worldwide per year we lose a forest area that is about four times the size of Netherlands, but this is largely offset by forest gains. One mechanism that can explain forest expansion is the phenomenon of forest transition: the shift from forest loss to forest gain that various countries are currently going through. However, the pathways to this transition may differ substantially for each region and country. Therefore, we should look beyond aggregate deforestation data at global level, and instead focus on forest *dynamics*—either deforestation or forest transitions—and the pathways behind these in *specific* regions, countries and areas. And we should so in particular because of the doubts about the reliability of aggregate figures in global datasets.

6.3 Global Forest Governance: Regime or *Non*-Regime?

Besides continuous deforestation, the other key argument used to support the claim that global forest governance has largely failed is the absence of an effective forest regime. Generally, a regime is described as principles, norms, rules and procedures that govern a given issue area in international relations (Arts 2000; Krasner 1982).

Examples of such issue areas are international trade, development cooperation or the global environment. Dimitrov et al. (2007), however, speak of a *non*-regime in the forest case, because *legally binding* rules that can be enforced upon countries and, through them, upon forest users are absent. This is remarkable, according to Dimitrov et al., because the circumstances seem to have been favourable for such a regime (high value of forests, high rates of deforestation and forest degradation, and strong political pressures from NGOs). Indeed, there have been several attempts by the international community to adopt a legally binding instrument (LBI) specifically for forests, but all have failed (Hoogeveen and Verkooijen 2010; Humphreys 2006; Pülzl 2010; Rayner et al. 2010). Most observers attribute this failure to the diverse forest values and interests of the various countries around the world: some countries have much forests, others do not; some produce timber, others mainly import it; some countries prioritise the economic value of forests, others the environmental value; some consider forests as a global common good, others as a natural resource to be governed nationally, and so on. Therefore, international forest negotiations have always been very complex and conflict-ridden, and an LBI has never come into being. As an alternative, many of the countries and NGOs involved have turned to other, multiple, options for forest governance: non-binding, private and public–private rules and mechanisms. Hoogeveen and Verkooijen (2010) call this the *portfolio* approach.

The question is whether or not non-binding initiatives constitute a regime. Regime theorists have been arguing this question for decades (Humphreys 2006; Krasner 1982; Rittberger 1993; Young 1980). Some prefer the strict option of an issue-specific binding 'treaty regime' (Dimitrov et al. 2007; Visseren-Hamakers et al. 2011); others prefer the broad option of a 'regime complex' that may contain soft law too, i.e. voluntary and private rules, as well as binding conventions on related topics (Rayner et al. 2010). If, as is our preference, the latter perspective is adopted, then the main elements of the current international forest regime complex are the following:

- Non-legally binding instruments, for example adopted by the UNCED Rio Conference in 1992 ('Authoritative Statement on Forests' and Chap. 11 of Agenda 21) and by the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) in 2007 ('Non-Legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests'). These instruments aim at promoting ideas and norms related to the conservation and sustainable use of forests worldwide (Hoogeveen and Verkooijen 2010).
- Voluntary instruments of international organisations like FAO, UNFF and Forest Europe, such as National Forest Programmes (NFPs) and Criteria and Indicators (C&I) for sustainable forest management (Rayner et al. 2010).
- Programmes and procedures of international organisations and bodies, such as FAO (agriculture and forestry), UNFF (forest dialogue in the UN), International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO; timber trade), UN Commission for Sustainable Development (the role of forests in sustainable development), and the World Bank (design and funding of forest programs and projects, particularly in developing countries) (Humphreys 2006).

- Private instruments, such as certification programmes, to promote sustainable forest management and sustainable production and consumption of timber in the international chain and the market (e.g. Forest Stewardship Council, FSC, and Program for the Endorsement of Forest Certification, PEFC) (Cashore et al. 2004).
- Programmes and procedures of public–private partnerships, such as the Round Table of Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) and the Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF) (Visseren-Hamakers and Glasbergen 2007).
- Legally binding treaties on forest issues that cover only part of the international forest agenda, such as the International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA), which aims at the expansion and diversification of trade in tropical timber (Humphreys 2006).
- Legally binding treaties on related topics, such as CITES (to ban or limit trade in endangered species), RAMSAR (protection of wetlands), UNFCCC (climate change), UNCCD (prevention of desertification) and CBD (conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity) that all in their own way relate to forest issues (respectively: endangered tree species, forests in wetlands, carbon stocks, anti-erosion measures and forest biodiversity) (Rayner et al. 2010).
- Bilateral agreements, such as the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) initiative of the EU and certain timber-exporting tropical countries, to ban illegally logged timber from the European market via timber-tracking systems, public procurement policies and due diligence regulations for the private sector (Beeko and Arts 2010).

If the broad regime complex perspective is adopted, it is of course *non*-sense to maintain the proposition of a forest *non*-regime. Many ideas, norms and rules on forest and forest-related issues are indeed available internationally, as the above overview shows, so we assume that a forest regime exists, although it definitely does not address all the underlying drivers of deforestation and forest degradation (such as agricultural expansion, unrestricted forest concessions, or forest fires). The next question, of course, is whether such (mainly non-binding) ideas, norms and rules have implications for forestry, forest protection and forest-related livelihoods worldwide. Dimitrov (2005) is very clear on this. He contends that these are all symbolic and impotent institutions that governments nonetheless adopt to produce a smokescreen—as if they are doing something to respond to forest problems and political pressures—while their national interests prompt them to be inactive on forests at the international level. So, voluntary norms are adopted, but without any intention of really affecting countries and forest users on the ground. Humphreys (2006) too is quite pessimistic about the ability of the international forest regime to halt deforestation and degradation. Although he adopts a broader definition of a forest regime than Dimitrov, his conclusions are similar. He talks about a crisis in global forest governance. Because it is in the interests of countries and corporations to continue exploiting forests unrestrictedly worldwide, international rules on forest protection and sustainable forest management remain limited and ineffective.

We disagree with these 'failure accounts' of the international forest regime, at least partially. Besides putting the aggregate deforestation data in critical perspective, as was done in Sect. 6.2 above, our main argument below is that international ideas and discourses on sustainable forest management and forest conservation have been institutionalised in (inter)national norms and rules, which in turn have co-shaped local practices of forest use and management. To elaborate this argument, we introduce discursive institutionalism, practice theory and the terms 'multiple practices of policy performance' in the next two sections.

6.4 Institutions, Discourses, Practices

Discursive institutionalism has emerged from the debate on institutional dynamics (Schmidt 2005). Most institutional approaches have been well able to explain stability or continuity in terms of collective action—through norm-directed behaviour, standard operating procedures, path dependency or institutional logics—but have been much less able to account for institutional change and dynamics. One answer to this challenge has been discursive institutionalism, which attributes such dynamics to ideational and discursive change that 'trickles down' in institutions and practices (Blyth 2002; Hajer 1995; Schmidt 2008). Within this perspective, social dynamics are explained by new ideas and discourses that emerge in society—including in science—and force institutions to adapt or even to disappear. Well-known examples of discursive-institutional change are: (1) the shift from Keynesianism to Monetarism in economics in the early 1980s, a shift that induced fundamental reforms in the welfare state, and (2) the introduction of perestroika and glasnost by Gorbatsjov in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, which led to the fall of communism (Schmidt 2005).

In discursive institutionalism, a discourse is generally described as the representation, communication and framing of ideas in social interaction that may or may not become institutionalized in social practices (Arts and Buizer 2009). Whether, how and when specific ideas become dominant, in other words 'get institutionalised', and others do not, may depend on many factors, e.g. credibility, relevance, resonance, consistency and coherence of ideas and discourses (Schmidt 2008). If perceived as legitimate by large groups of actors, they will deploy adherent and repetitive behaviour in accordance with those ideas, thereby 'anchoring' them in socially-embedded rules, norms and beliefs. Therefore, institutions are not something 'external' or 'given' (unless they are forced upon a community by external interventionists), but internal and contingent to social practices. They are continuously (re-)produced by agents through communicative interaction which makes both institutional continuity and change understandable. To analyse this linkage, Schmidt (2008) makes the distinction between people's 'background ideational ability' to make sense of and act upon rules, norms and beliefs and their 'foreground discursive ability' to deliberately maintain or change institutions.

Discursive-institutionalism is, however, criticised for being 'light' or 'thin' on discourse theory (Arts and Buizer 2009). It comes close to Habermasian approaches of discourse, which are deliberations based upon communicative rationality (Habermas 1996). This position can easily lead to an analysis of words, language and text without taking account of the social practices which are inherently intertwined with discourses (Hajer 1995). Also, the focus of discursive institutionalism is mainly on formal institutional arrangements, so deviations from or the reshaping of ideas, norms and rules in informal everyday practices can easily be overlooked (Cleaver 2002). Inspired by the practice based approach of this book, we would therefore like to add insights from critical institutionalism and practice theory to discursive institutionalism. Critical institutionalism shifts analytical focus from rules, norms and beliefs *as such* to their actual *enactment* in daily practices (Cleaver 2002; De Koning 2011). By doing so, critical institutionalists claim that rules, norms and beliefs are neither simply followed nor literally implemented, but instead are actively re-interpreted, re-negotiated and re-shaped by agencies, often producing different outcomes than the rules of the game predict. These scholars refer to this process as 'institutional bricolage', as it shows how people act as 'bricoleurs', responding strategically, or improvising with rules, norms and beliefs (see Chap. 4 of this book).

Practice theory also focuses on what is actually being done by human beings in concrete situations, sites and settings, but shifts attention away from institutions as key elements of social life towards social practices as a whole. In this book, a social practice is viewed as an ensemble of doings, sayings and things in a field of activity (compare Wagenaar and Cook 2003; Schatzki 2002). This approach takes the lifeworlds of people in certain social or professional fields as points of departure and analyses them in an integrated manner, taking into account, for example, situated agencies, bodily movements, local knowledge, people's narratives, socially-embedded norms, and the material and living things people relate to (Reckwitz 2002; Wagenaar 2011). While doing so, it tries to do justice to the complexity of social life and the situatedness of human beings. It also wishes to counterbalance the formalistic and reductionist conceptualisations of human behaviour and society in much social theory (Bevir 2010). For example, Bourdieu (1990) posits the 'logic of practice' versus rational choice and institutional choice theories. He maintains that the drivers of human behaviour are neither rational calculations nor the conformation to rules, norms and beliefs, but instead are the generative principles of specific social practices. And these logics can only be retrieved from interpreting practices *themselves* from the inside, not from externally applied formal theories or ideal-type models, such as rational choice and institutionalism. Finally, practice theory criticises the often assumed hierarchical relationship between agency and structure in social affairs—or in our case, between global context and local sites—and posits instead a more horizontal worldview.

The combination of discursive institutionalism and practice theory implies a number of things for the analysis and understanding of the interface between global forest governance and in situ forest practices: (1) a 'logic of practice' perspective should be kept in mind while interpreting actors, discourses and

institutions in concrete situations, sites and settings; (2) therefore, global ideas, norms and rules should be linked to what people actually do and say on the ground, through a 'glocal network' perspective; and (3) it should be acknowledged that 'external' policies and institutions, such as those from global forest governance, do not hierarchically determine local practices, but co-shape these in interaction with situated actors.

6.5 Multiple Practices of Policy Performance

The above theoretical framework is in the tradition of interpretative policy analysis (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Wagenaar 2011). In this field, policies are not considered 'given' plans, laws and regulations that address 'objective' problems, but systems of meaning that define societal phenomena *as* policy problems in the first place and that are differently interpreted by various actors in the policy field in the second. This interpretive position has consequences for policy evaluation. No longer can a policy be conceptualised as a closed circle—or a policy cycle (Dunn 2003)—of linear connections between policy objectives, policy implementation and policy evaluation: a cycle in which objectives are first fixed, then implemented through certain means and evaluated on the basis of the fulfilment of these objectives. In the interpretive alternative, however, objectives are considered as multi-interpretive and dynamic, with implementation as a complex, messy and contingent process whereby policies are re-negotiated and reshaped 'on the ground', and evaluation is a performative act. Hence, successes or failures are neither given nor discovered, but actively *performed* by evaluators, in accordance with their theoretical approaches, evaluation methodologies and personal values and attitudes (Mosse 2005; Van Assche et al. 2011). Interpretative researchers engaged in evaluation studies prefer to do in-depth case studies or ethnographic studies to reconstruct, together with local practitioners and professionals, the enactment of external policies in local practices. Here, it is not the achievement of pre-fixed policy goals that is the focus of analysis, but the way people interpret, value, act upon and reshape such goals.

The failure of global forest governance recounted above has been 'performed' by certain authors, who have referred to a number of regime objectives that have not been fulfilled (reduction of deforestation and adoption of a legally binding forest treaty). Below, however, we will present another narrative of the same regime, pointing at two 'success stories' for forests and communities on the ground. We call this phenomenon 'multiple practices of policy performance'. Global forest governance is considered as producing various effects by different evaluators; hence, we observe multiple scientific practices of performing success and failure in this field. But the terms also have another meaning, referring to policy performance in local practices *per se*. Policies *do* something, produce effects, both intended and unintended; they are biased, include and exclude things, enable some and constrain others, and attach specific roles to people, thus

interfering in local power structures (Hajer 1995; Mosse 2005; Van Tatenhove et al. 2000). In that sense, they create—or try to create—realities in accordance with their own images and values. This type of performance can also be referred to as 'performativity': how discourses, datasets or policies become self-fulfilling prophecies, through naturalising limited and biased information as 'the truth' and through disciplining agencies to perform prescribed doings and sayings (Nash 2000; Van Assche et al. 2011). However, from critical institutionalism we also learn that agencies are to be considered 'bricoleurs', who have the capacity to improvise upon, to strategically respond to, to resist, or to ignore external policies, informed as they are by their own socially-embedded practical logics (Bourdieu 1990; Cleaver 2002; De Koning 2011). Policy effects are therefore always the result of the performativity of policies on the one hand and, on the other, of their enactment by agents in specific sites.

Below, we will analyse and evaluate two local cases of policy interventions in Tanzania that are nonetheless strongly related to global ideas, norms and rules: participatory forest management and forest certification. In doing so, we will use the concepts as indicated above. First, the emergence and contents of global discourses on both issues will be highlighted. Secondly, the institutionalisation of these discourses in international norms and national policies will be assessed. And in a third step, the two local Tanzanian cases will be described. The aim is to analyse practices of participation and certification and to understand how global ideas, norms and rules are performed by people on the ground and feed (or do not) into their logics of practice. The first two steps are based on a literature review, the third step on data collected by in-depth fieldwork by means of interviews, focus group discussions, surveys and participatory observation.

6.6 Global Forest Discourses and Norms

In a review paper, we charted the emergence and change of various forest discourses at global level since the 1970s, as distinguished in the scientific literature (Arts et al. 2010). The discourses ranged from those on tropical deforestation, wood fuel, protected forest areas and forest decline (the classical ones) to those on sustainable forest management, forest biodiversity, indigenous knowledge, forests and climate change, biomass and forest governance (the more recent ones). Two of these discourses are particularly relevant for identifying the 'discursive roots' of our two Tanzanian case studies on participation and certification. One is the discourse on sustainable forest management (SFM), the other is the discourse on forest governance.

SFM became particularly relevant to the forestry sector after the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro (UNCED). In the aftermath of that conference the concept of sustainable development became popularised, although it was originally mainstreamed by the Brundtland report *Our Common Future* in the late 1980s (WCED 1987). It refers to a development style that meets the needs of the present without compromising the needs of future

generations; hence, poverty should be eradicated as soon as possible, while the earth system should be preserved for the future. The sustainability concept, though, was far from new. Interestingly, it originated in German forestry during the 19th century (Rayner et al. 2010; Wiersum 1995). At that time, the notion of 'sustained yield' was introduced, to balance human needs for forest products with the production capacity of the forests ('harvest equals increment'). It was a response to the deforestation, forest degradation and timber scarcity in Europe at that time (due to war, clearing, fires, cultivation, lack of regulations, etc.). At a later stage, the concept of sustainable yield was broadened, because its production-oriented focus could not offer solutions to other forest-related problems (such as environmental deterioration and lack of social welfare around timber production sites). Ecological and social dimensions were subsequently added, and recently the concept of SFM has emerged. Today, SFM is based on the three pillars of sustainable development—economic viability, ecological sustainability and societal legitimacy—whereas the UN Forum on Forests considers SFM to consist of seven dimensions that should be sustained and improved for the future (forest resources, biological diversity, forest health/vitality, productive functions, protective functions, socio-economic functions and governance framework).[1] SFM, or variants thereof, such as sustainable management of forests or forest ecosystem management, has become institutionalised as a norm in various instruments of the international forest regime, both public (Non-Legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests) and private (Forest Stewardship Council), both binding (Convention on Biological Diversity) and non-binding (Rio Forest Principles; National Forest Programs; SFM Criteria and Indicators). Also, SFM now forms the basis of most forest policy and management around the world (FAO 2010). There are, however, many routes to Rome, so there are many ways to govern SFM – including community participation and forest certification.

Traditionally, the state has been very dominant in governing forests, not only in Europe (let alone in the Socialist East before 1989), but also in the colonies and in the post-colonial era (Scott 1998). In order to prevent a Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin 1968), it was believed that the state should regulate ownership and access to natural resources such as forests, as otherwise private resource users—in their continuous pursuit of personal gain—would jointly erode the resource base. In many cases, however, colonial, post-colonial and also capitalist and socialist states proved to be even worse managers of the forests than ordinary people: (1) by exploiting the resource to the extreme, often putting local livelihoods at risk, (2) by issuing concessions to private companies or public enterprises without any effective monitoring mechanism in place, and (3) by being absentee managers, leaving the forests open to local, often illegal, use (Humphreys 2006; Peluso 1992). This situation led to increasing criticism from different angles. There was opposition by grass-roots movements, which fought for local forest rights; there was pressure from international organisations and donors, who advocated

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[1] http://www.un.org/esa/forests/index.html.

sustainable forest management; and there were protests by NGOs, which claimed the need for forest conservation (Agrawal et al. 2008). For all these reasons, many countries around the world have recently reformed public forest policy and law—a process which is called 'forest governance' or 'good forest governance'.

Current forest governance mainly comes in three forms: (1) decentralisation, (2) participation, and (3) marketisation (Agrawal et al. 2008; Lemos and Agrawal 2006). The central idea behind Participatory Forest Management, or PFM, is that local management of forests, either by communities or jointly with forest departments, is more effective than management by central state institutions, because 'ownership', either *de juro* or *de facto*, is given back to the people. As long ago as the early 1970s, the idea of community participation was being put into practice in a few countries, advocated by NGOs and scientists and intensively discussed in the FAO at global level (Arnold 2001). Later, these ideas became norms in international law, both as hard and soft law, e.g. in Agenda 21, the Rio Forest Principles, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Non-Legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests. Such ideas and norms have also permeated to national levels, or strengthened already existing participatory approaches in countries. For example, India, Nepal, Mexico, Bolivia, Kenya and Tanzania have pioneered different forms of PFM since the early 1990s, and many countries, from Ethiopia to Albania, have followed. Today, about 25 per cent of the world's forests are (co)managed by local communities (FAO 2010).

An example of marketisation is forest certification (Cashore et al. 2004; Visseren-Hamakers and Glasbergen 2007). It entails a market-based mechanism of independent labelling and monitoring that aims to guarantee to both consumers and producers that timber products originate from sustainably managed forests. Global debates on forest certification started back in the 1980s in the ITTO (International Tropical Timber Organization), but for years countries could not agree on a system (Humphreys 2006). Frustrated about this government failure, non-state actors took the lead themselves. The first international organisation for forest certification was the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), established in 1993. Because this was an NGO-led initiative, with quite stringent requirements on SFM, business initiatives followed later; today, the largest is the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC). Together, the FSC and PEFC now cover nearly 400 million hectares forests worldwide (about 10 per cent of the world's forests) and thousands of companies and products, although most of these are located and traded in the global North.[2] FSC standards are now used in 80 countries and PEFC in 30. Recently, the FSC standards have been further modified, to include specific standards for small-scale and community-managed forests (De Pourcq et al. 2009; Wiersum et al. 2011).

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[2] http://www.fsc.org/77.html; http://www.pefc.org/.

6.7 Participatory Forest Management in Babati District, Tanzania

Decentralisation of forests started in Tanzania in the early 1980s (Blomley et al. 2008; Kajembe and Nduwamungu 2004). The Local Government (District) Authorities Act of 1982 empowered the village councils to propose bylaws related to natural resources management, while the district councils were given the power to approve these bylaws. This process of decentralisation was also reflected in the development of the National Land Policy of 1995 and the National Forest Policy of 1998. These two policies recognise the active participation of local communities and local government in the management of land and forest resources. Under this new umbrella of decentralisation, participatory forest management (PFM) was adopted in Tanzania too. Over time, the Tanzanian PFM approach developed into two approaches: joint forest management (JFM) and community-based forest management (CBFM). Under the JFM arrangement, which is applied mainly in national or local forest reserves, the forest rights are usually held by the government and the communities, assisted by the district forest office, are the local managers. Under the CBFM arrangement, on the other hand, local people are both owners and managers. It applies to 'village forest lands'. Since the villages that are dealt with below are under different forest regimes—both JFM and CBFM—we will continue using the general notion of PFM.

This case study focuses on four villages in Babati district in Northern Tanzania (Babili and Arts, forthcoming). A pilot PFM scheme has been running in that district since 1994. Previously, the forests close to the villages functioned in practice as open access regimes, so deforestation and degradation were severe. It was hoped that the PFM programme would help reverse these trends, by a combination of 'rights' and 'responsibilities': the forest revenues and rights were (partly) returned to the communities, who, in exchange, were made responsible for managing the forest actively and responsibly. International donors (from Sweden (SIDA) and Norway (NORAD) were closely involved in setting up the programme. Through them, global ideas and norms strongly associated with the international donor community, and national policies strongly linked with the Tanzanian government, entered local spaces. The donors provided PFM methodology and facilitated the design and setting up of the projects in the villages. The latter was done in a participatory way. The project designs were discussed with the villagers, and the village councils played a key role in the design and implementation. Initially, the projects faced opposition, as villagers feared that PFM would imply restrictions to the access to and use of forest resources they had previously enjoyed, and thus they feared for their forest-dependent livelihoods. This opposition was softened through argumentation and deliberation (because livelihoods would be threatened in the long run anyway, given current deforestation and degradation trends) and by amending the programme (allowing local people to play a bigger role). The result was that the PFM projects were ultimately adopted by majority voting in the village councils.

Practically, PFM would imply many things: a forest village committee being set up; new rules on forest use and management; zoning of the forests; reforestation and afforestation; restrictions or even bans on timber harvesting, cattle grazing and charcoal production; a system of permits, sanctions, fees and fines; a system of monitoring (forest guards); and a contract with the district forest department. In other words, the new idea of PFM brought with it an entire 'institutional package', which started to interfere with daily practices and local institutions. In particular, there was resistance to restrictions on grazing and 'illegal' use (because livestock are crucial for villagers' livelihoods). In one village, a ban on grazing was announced twice and then lifted twice. Here we observe 'bricolage practices' (see Chap. 4) in relation to a rule that did not match the logic of practice on the ground. In addition, fines and fees were regularly adapted over time: increased to reduce illegal use, or lowered to accommodate resistance (again in the case of grazing). And the new rules, norms and beliefs did not automatically match the traditional, socially-embedded institutions. The role of the elders in sacred forest management was challenged by the village forest committee, the importance of ritual forest patches diminished, and the protection of catchment forests and certain tree species according to customary law lost some of its meaning, and was replaced by PFM rules. In addition, the village councils and the forest committees sometimes disagreed about authority: who had a say in what, and when. A final observation on 'the package' is that the roles of the district forest department and of its forest officials in the field did not totally vanish in PFM, but they did change dramatically: from issuing commands and fining people to facilitating a new management system. Such roles were, of course, not immediately internalised, so here too, conflicts arose now and then.

From the literature we learn that the results of PFM in various countries—e.g. India, Nepal, Mexico, Bolivia, Kenya—have so far been reported as 'mixed' (Charnley and Poe 2007; Mustalahti and Lund 2010). Where success is reported, this usually relates to the condition of the forest rather than to enhancing local livelihoods or empowering local people. Also, PFM has itself been the subject of serious power struggles. Elite capture in village forest committees has frequently been reported, as have conflicts between forest officials and communities over valuable timber resources and land rights. This Tanzanian case, though, can be seen as atypical in terms of various indicators (income, governance, forest condition). A survey of nearly 400 households in the four villages in 2008 yielded the following results (Babili and Arts, forthcoming):

- About 85 % of the respondents had observed an improvement in the forest condition since the introduction of PFM. They mentioned an increase of the forest cover, more reliable water springs, growth of more grasses (fodder!), reintroduction of some lost tree species (for example African teak), less soil erosion on forested slopes, and an increase of wildlife, particularly monkeys and leopards (which was welcomed by the forest rangers, but received with mixed feelings by the villagers, because monkeys may destroy harvests and leopards prey on animals which are also useful for people). Some of these perceptions, particularly relating to the change in forest cover, could be validated by GIS data. A time

series of satellite images of the four village forests under PFM—about 2,800 hectares in total—revealed an increase in forest cover over time. Whereas this cover declined by about 50 hectares in the 1990s, in the first decade of the 21st century there was a gain of about 100 hectares (bearing in mind that PFM started in 1994 and that the population pressure in the area has increased since then).

- About 90 % of the respondents considered that a number of governance indicators had improved since the introduction of PFM. The relationship with the district forest department and forest officials had strongly improved, they were being held much more accountable than they had been in the past, and there were more opportunities for people to participate in the forest institutions.
- PFM scored worst in relation to its impact on livelihoods and income. About 80 % of the respondents reported their income had remained the same since the introduction of PFM. Household income data from the survey also show no statistically significant differences between forest-related income before and after the introduction of PFM. One can react to this result in two ways. One is with concern, because in the end, it must be possible to earn a livelihood in this impoverished region, so any management system—PFM or otherwise—should produce enough income, or better, *more* income, to improve the livelihood situation of the poor. On the other hand, given all the restrictions that came with PFM by comparison with the open access situation that had existed previously, the fact that incomes had remained more or less at the same level was not such a bad result.

All in all, PFM performed quite well in this region. And others have also reported some fairly successful PFM practices in Tanzania (Blomley et al. 2008). So, an idea that started off as being general and globally discussed, travelled around the world as a norm, became institutionalised in national policies and local practices, and the local people experienced the resulting effects on households and forests on the ground as being generally beneficial. In this case, global forest governance can be envisaged as a strong global–local nexus: starting from the FAO offices in Rome, going to the SIDA offices in Stockholm and then to the government departments in Dar es Salaam and, finally, to the villages in Babati district.

6.8 Forest Certification in Kikole, Tanzania

Kikole is a small community of about 250 households in Southeast Tanzania (Salasala 2011). Since 2004, it has managed a forest area of about 450 hectares under the PFM programme (see above). This forest is rich in African blackwood (*Dalbergia melanoxylon*) that is well suited for carving statues and making music instruments. Until recently, this timber was sold on the local market for low prices, and although the forest was being managed under a statutory management plan under PFM, illegal logging remained a huge problem. In order to try to halt this, the regional NGO Mpingo Conservation and Development Initiative (MCDI) started to engage communities in a Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) group certification process in order

not only to conserve and sustainably manage the resource, but also to foster local livelihoods by legally harvesting and selling timber on the international market. Kikole became part of this initiative, and after a transitional period of education, capacity building, change of forest use and management practices and external auditing, the community-managed forest was awarded an FSC certificate in 2009. Hence, through MCDI, Kikole entered the global certification community, which endorses particular ideas, norms and rules that henceforth started to co-shape everyday life related to forests and trees in this village too.

In 2010, the first certified timber was harvested—worth about USD 1,800 and destined for the UK market. This sum of money was largely spent on public investments (drinking water, health care). In addition, the FSC project delivered jobs, built organisational capacity, raised the community's profile and reconfirmed local ownership of the forests (Salasala 2011). Shifting cultivation in the forests and forest fires have diminished, whereas wildlife—particularly elephants and monkeys—has increased (although most locals are not happy with this; see below). But the most important result was that the community could now sell blackwood at a price that was about 400 times higher (!) than before, i.e. the difference between the local (mainly) illegal market and the global certified market. It has often been claimed that the price premium of FSC is low, or even absent, but in this case, the situation is clearly different (De Pourcq et al. 2009).

This result is all the more remarkable since FSC certification has generally been a complicated business for local communities. Whereas about 25 % of the world's forests are under some system of community management, less than 5 % of FSC certification is community-based.[3] Also, case studies show that it is difficult for communities—and often not attractive socio-economically—to get or keep a certificate after external auditing (De Pourcq et al. 2009; Wiersum et al. 2011). And if a community does succeed in obtaining certification, it is usually very dependent on external support—from NGOs, donors, foresters, timber sellers and buyers, etc. What will happen when this support is withdrawn? In the case of Kikole too, the role of external supporters is huge. The NGO MCDI has already been mentioned. This NGO is sponsored by WWF, BP, Conservation International, and Norway, amongst others, which—by the way —also makes it susceptible to global ideas and norms, not least when trying to get donor funding. And market demand in the UK is very dependent on the Sound and Fair Campaign, which actively lobbies the musical instrument industry to buy the Tanzanian certified blackwood. The vulnerability of the initiative is moreover increased by adverse effects locally. Some of FSC's requirements are at odds with local practices and logics. For example, conflicts between humans and wildlife, particularly elephants, have increased. Whereas these animals used to be kept away by fires, now that it is forbidden to burn forest they are again becoming a nuisance in the villages, forests and fields. Alternatives to keep them at bay (e.g. burning pepper in the forest) have not yet proven to be effective. And a ban on shifting cultivation is not necessarily a good thing for all households from a livelihood perspective.

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[3] http://www.fsc.org/77.html.

The case of Kikole community certification under FSC is an exceptional (although not perfect) success story, because certification resulted in an income premium that had never previously been experienced. Additionally, the revenue was invested to benefit the local people, jobs were created, and the condition of the forest improved. Yet problems remain related to encounters between humans and wildlife, shifting cultivation and a strong dependence on external donors and niche markets, and this makes the initiative rather vulnerable. Nonetheless, on the whole, admission to the global certification community seems to have produced positive effects for this community so far.

If we take both cases from Tanzania together, it is tempting to assume that they might be part of a more general 'smallholder pathway' towards a forest transition in Tanzania (Meyfroidt and Lambin 2011). After all, both cases show an improvement in the condition of the forest. Others, too, have also shown that PFM in Tanzania is effective (Blomley et al. 2008). Yet, as a whole, Tanzania is still losing forest (about 1 per cent, or over 400,000 hectares, of its area annually; FAO 2010). So it seems that more Babatis and Kikoles as well as more pathways than the smallholder one will be needed to push the country towards a national forest transition.

6.9 Conclusion

Governance success and failure are performed by evaluators, not discovered. In this chapter, an account of global forest governance failure is juxtaposed with our own account of two 'global' success stories. Table 6.1 below summarises the main arguments of these two accounts in this chapter (so the table cannot be generalised). Aggregate figures on worldwide deforestation and a legal argument that the international forest regime is in fact an ineffective *non*-regime are at odds with various and country-specific pathways of forest transitions and two positive experiences with participatory forest management and forest certification in Tanzania, both strongly influenced by global ideas, norms and rules. The global forest governance failure is informed by a strict definition of a regime, i.e. a *treaty* regime, our account by a much broader interpretation of a regime *complex*, in which voluntary ideas, norms and rules are also considered relevant. Moreover, these are assumed to travel from the global to the local, and vice versa, through networks of forest departments, scientists, policy makers, donors, companies, NGOs, social movements, etc. This is a rather horizontal way of looking at the world, which stands in opposition to the vertical one of mainstream regime theory, which assumes that only hierarchical power embedded in the hard law of a treaty regime can change national politics. Theoretically, both accounts are different too: institutions and interest as key concepts on the one hand, and discourses, institutions and practices on the other. Finally, the evaluations were done differently: an assessment of the achievement of regime objectives on the one hand, versus

Table 6.1 Comparison of different accounts of success and failure in global forest governance

Global forest governance	Account of 'failure' (global forest governance literature)	Account of 'success' (this chapter)
Main arguments	1. Deforestation continues; 2. No legally binding forest treaty	1. Pathways of forest transition; 2. Success stories of participatory forest management and forest certification
Theoretical perspective	Treaty regime	Regime complex; discursive institutionalism; practice theory
Worldview	Vertical: international regimes and national politics	Horizontal: ideas, norms and rules travel through 'glocal' networks
Assessment	Regime effectiveness; goal achievement	People's and researcher's interpretations of the local performance of global ideas, norms and rules

people's interpretations, as reconstructed by the researchers, of the local performance of global ideas, norms and rules on the other.

It is of course up to the reader to decide which of the two accounts is the most persuasive. Yet, we would argue that interpretive policy analysis and evaluation are to be preferred because a few aggregate, de-contextualised and reductionist indicators can never fully capture the richness, complexity and messiness of how global governance relates to social fields and practices, nor fully grasp their performance in terms of success and failure, as experienced by those involved. This is not to say, by the way, that an interpretive account of global forest governance will necessarily describe, or 'perform', success stories (or that mainstream regime theory will always identify failure; as said, the table cannot be generalised in these terms). Here we have focused on cases in which positive effects on forests and people have been reported by the communities, to counterbalance narratives on global forest governance failure. But of course, there are many practices out there that might point at problems, difficulties and dilemmas as well (for example, communities that lost their certification after three years, participatory forest committees hijacked by village elites, community forestry that makes no difference to the forest, fraudulent use of the FSC label, corruption in forest management, social conflicts due to new local forest institutions, etc.). Therefore, a focus on other cases of participatory forest management and forest certification elsewhere in the world would probably have produced different outcomes. But that is exactly what is meant by the concept 'multiple practices of policy performance'.

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